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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Matthew Cudney was terminated from his employment
with ALSCO, Inc. a few weeks after reporting to his supervisor and human resources manager that he observed the branch general manager
appearing intoxicated at work and driving away in a company vehicle.1
Cudney brought an action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy, claiming that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting the
manager’s drinking and driving.2 Cudney asserted that the Washington
Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) establishes a public policy
protecting workers who report safety violations.3 He also asserted that
Washington’s DUI laws4 clearly indicate a public policy protecting the
public from drunk drivers.5 In a 5–4 decision, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the statutory remedies available under WISHA are adequate to protect the underlying public policy.6 The court also held that
Washington’s criminal DUI laws are not an inadequate means of promoting the public policy, and that the public policy—rather than Cudney’s
own interests—must be promoted.7 Based on these two conclusions, the
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1. Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 245 (Wash. 2011).
2. Id. at 245–46.
3. Id. at 246.
4. The term “DUI laws” refers to Washington’s laws criminalizing driving while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.502 (2012), 46.61.5055 (2012).
5. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 246.
6. Id. at 250.
7. Id.
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court held that Cudney’s tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy could not proceed.8
This Note contends that the Cudney court erred in determining that
WISHA adequately promotes the public policy of insuring workplace
safety; in deciding that public safety is adequately promoted by Washington’s DUI laws; and in finding that the common law exception of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy does not apply in this
case. The court’s conclusion that WISHA was an adequate remedy was
erroneous because of the unreasonably short time period available to file
a claim under the statute, the lack of a robust administrative scheme, and
the lack of full remedies available to a discharged employee. Furthermore, the court’s determination that DUI laws adequately promote public
policy, regardless of whether a remedy is available to the terminated employee, leaves an employee with no recourse for a wrongful termination
and may discourage employees from reporting criminal activity.
This Note proceeds in seven parts. Part II discusses the history of
employment at-will in Washington as well as the development of the
public policy exception. This section also addresses the four-factor test
adopted by the court to analyze a wrongful discharge claim. Part III introduces the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act, including the
public policy served by the Act, as well as the protections provided for
workers. In addition, this Part highlights cases in which the court found
the public policy exception applicable for claims premised on workplace
protection laws. This Part also discusses the split in other jurisdictions
regarding the adequacy of statutory remedies. Part IV introduces Washington’s DUI laws and discusses what remedies are available under the
criminal statutes. Part V analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in
Cudney and discusses the final resolution of the case. Part VI discusses
possible future implications of the Cudney decision and proposes remedial legislation that the Washington State Legislature should adopt. Part
VII concludes that the Washington Supreme Court incorrectly foreclosed
a common law cause of action in the Cudney case, and that action by the
court or the legislature is necessary to properly balance the interests of
employers, employees, and society.
II. WASHINGTON EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL AND THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION
This Part discusses the development of Washington’s employment
at-will doctrine, including the public policy exception, and sets out the
8. Id. at 251.
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four-part test that a court will use in analyzing a tort claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.
A. Doctrine of Employment At-Will
Under the doctrine of employment at-will, either the employer or
employee may terminate an employment contract of indefinite period atwill without incurring liability.9 Washington has recognized the doctrine
since as early as 1928;10 the doctrine’s roots stem from a treatise written
by Horace Gray Wood in 1877.11 Although employment at-will remains
the default rule, an employer’s ability to terminate an employee has been
constrained by both state and federal law. For example, statutes prohibit
an employer from discharging an employee based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.12 Further, statutes prohibit employers from
discharging an employee who has filed a complaint with the government
regarding workplace safety13 or minimum wage violations.14 Some statutes require that certain public employees are terminated only for
cause.15 In addition to statutory constraints, the doctrine of employment
at-will may be limited by contract between the parties; moreover, collective bargaining agreements may prohibit an employer from terminating
an employee except for cause.16
9. Davidson v. Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 271 P. 878 (Wash. 1928). The employment at-will
rule allows an employer to dismiss an at-will employee “for any reason or no reason.” HENRY H.
PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.01 (5th ed. Supp. 2009).
10. Davidson, 271 P. 878.
11. HORACE GRAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877). Prior
to the development of the at-will doctrine, employment was viewed in light of the master–servant
relationship, in which a general hiring, without a specified time limit, was construed as a contract for
one year. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.03 (5th ed. 2006).
Following large-scale organization and production brought by the Industrial Revolution, both employers and employees sought more flexibility in negotiating employment terms. Id. at § 1.04.
Wood’s 1877 treatise repudiated the one-year contract rule and articulated the rule that “a general or
indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will.” Id. The at-will rule quickly spread and was adopted
by the majority of jurisdictions by as early as 1913. Id.; see also Jay M. Feinman, The Development
of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2; Washington Law Against Discrimination,
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2009) (mirroring the federal protections with the addition of protection for honorably discharged veterans and those with a sensory, mental, or physical handicap).
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.100 (2010).
15. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.400.300 (2012) (limiting discharge of school employees to “sufficient cause”), WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.08.090 (2007), 41.14.120 (2012), 41.12.090
(2007), 43.43.070 (1984) (requiring cause to discharge firefighters, sheriffs, city police, and Washington State Patrol officers).
16. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 3. See, e.g., Comfort & Fleming Ins. Brokers, Inc. v.
Hoxsey, 613 P.2d 138, 141 (Wash. 1980) (a contract provision requiring “[t]ermination for good
cause shown is a restriction on the employer’s right to discharge an employee at will”); Peninsula
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B. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
One judicial constraint on the doctrine of employment at-will is the
common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The
court will not allow the at-will doctrine to shield an employer’s action
“which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.”17 The
majority of states have also recognized the public policy exception as a
cause of action.18
The Washington Supreme Court first recognized the public policy
exception in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.19 The Thompson court
held that the “narrow public policy exception should be adopted because
it properly balances the interest of both the employer and employee.”20
The court recognized that a “growing majority” of jurisdictions had
adopted a public policy exception to the doctrine of employment atwill.21 In a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy,
the employee has the burden to show that the discharge contravened a
clear mandate of public policy.22
Since Thompson, the Washington Supreme Court has continued to
hold that the public policy exception should be construed narrowly.23 The
court has identified four general areas that discharge may be in violation
of a clear public policy: (1) where the employee was discharged for reSch. Dist. No. 401 v. Pub. Sch. Employees of Peninsula, 924 P.2d 13, 15 (Wash. 1996) (“Job security provisions, including a just cause limit on terminations, come within the ambit of ‘working conditions’ and constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.”).
17. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984). The public policy
tort “require[s] courts to balance employee, employer, and societal interests.” HENRY H. PERRITT
JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES § 3.1 (1991). The employer has an economic
interest in freely running its business, while the employee has an economic interest in maintaining
employment. Id. The public policy tort recognizes that society’s interests can tip the scales in either
direction. Id. Society’s interest in freedom of contract, expressed in the at-will rule, will add weight
to the employer’s side of the scale. Id. But if the discharge contravenes public policy, society’s interest in protecting that policy may tip the scales back to the employee’s side. Id.
18. Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer May Discharge
At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544 (1982) (listing thirty-four states that have recognized, or stated their willingness to recognize, the cause of action).
19. Thompson, 685 P.2d 1081.
20. Id. at 1089.
21. Id. at 1088. The court noted fifteen jurisdictions that had explicitly adopted the exception
and an additional two courts that had implied in dicta that they may. Id. at 1088 n. 1.
22. Id. at 1089.
23. See, e.g., Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 246 (Wash. 2011) (“From this court’s
first recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., we emphasized that ‘courts should proceed cautiously.’”) (quoting Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1089); Sedlacek v.
Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Wash. 2001) (“we have recognized that the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy is a narrow exception to the employment at-will doctrine in Washington
State”); Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1996) (“the exception should
be narrowly construed in order to guard against frivolous lawsuits”).
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fusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where the employee was discharged
due to performing a public duty or obligation; (3) where the employee
was discharged for exercising a legal right; and (4) where the employee
was discharged due to “whistleblowing” activity.24
1. The Four-Element Framework
The court in Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc. adopted a four-part
test for analyzing wrongful discharge claims involving violations of public policy.25 First, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a clear public
policy: the clarity element. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the public policy would be jeopardized if the conduct the employee engaged in
was discouraged: the jeopardy element. Third, the plaintiff must prove
that the conduct related to public policy caused the discharge: the causation element. Finally, the defendant must not be able to justify the discharge on other grounds: the absence of justification element.26
In Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc.—the focus of this Note—the parties
stipulated that WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws established clear
public policies and therefore the clarity element was not under consideration.27 The causation and absence of justification elements are typically
questions of fact, which are not usually decided on summary judgment,
and the court was not asked to consider these elements.28 The only element that the Cudney court was asked to decide was the jeopardy element.29
The court has recognized that the jeopardy element “strictly limits
the scope of claims under the tort of wrongful discharge.”30 In order to
24. Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006–07 (Wash. 1989) (providing case examples of each
general area). “Along with a growing number of jurisdictions, we recognize the public policy found
in protecting employees who are discharged in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e.,
employee ‘whistleblowing’ activity.” Id. at 1007. Generally, the term “whistleblower” refers to an
“employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). The term may also include an employee who makes a
complaint to “his or her superior within his employer’s organization.” DANIEL P. WESTMAN &
NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 22 (2d ed.
2004). “‘Whistleblowing’ occurs when an employee reports illegal or improper conduct to superiors
or to outside authorities and is discharged in retaliation for doing so. It falls within the ‘public policy’ exception to the at-will doctrine because, although no law compels an individual to step forward
and communicate his suspicions regarding criminal activity, public policy clearly favors the exposure of crime.” Wrongful Discharge, supra note 16, at § 117.
25. 913 P.2d 377.
26. Id. at 382 (adopting the test advocated in PERRITT, supra note 17, at § 3.7).
27. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 245–46.
28. Id. at 247 n.1.
29. Id. at 246.
30. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 139 (Wash. 2008).
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successfully prove the jeopardy element, the plaintiff must show that his
or her conduct directly relates to public policy, that other means of promoting public policy are inadequate, and that the actions the plaintiff
took were the “only available adequate means” to promote public policy.31
When the statutory source of a clear public policy also includes
administrative remedies, the jeopardy element is far more difficult for the
plaintiff to establish.32 However, in his treatise, Professor Perritt argues
that the administrative remedies can only shield employee conduct,
thereby precluding public policy tort claims, if the remedies “are available to the particular type of plaintiff involved.”33
III. WASHINGTON INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
This Part discusses the history, purpose, and enforcement of the
Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act. It also discusses cases
where a plaintiff has brought a claim of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy premised on WISHA or other workplace safety laws.
A. History and Purpose of the WISHA Statute
The Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 197334 was enacted following extensive federal legislation in 1970, which resulted in
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).35 Under OSHA, a state
may choose to maintain its own industrial safety plan, with approval
from the Secretary of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

31. Id.
32. PERRITT, supra note 17, at § 3.15.
33. Id.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17 (2013).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–677 (1970). On January 23, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a
message to Congress proposing a “comprehensive Occupational Health and Safety Program, to
protect the worker while he is on the job.” President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the
Congress, To Earn a Living: The Right of Every American, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Jan. 23, 1968) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?[id=28849. The President indicated that adequate protection did not exist to safeguard workers from hazards on the job and proposed federal
protection for all workers engaged in interstate commerce and federal support for the states to protect workers engaged in intra-state commerce. Id. at 8. Between 1968 and 1970, both the House and
Senate conducted hearings on the proposed Act before finally adopting the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 on December 29, 1970. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91–596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–677). OSHA sets out duties of employers and employees, 29 U.S.C. § 654, and delegates responsibility to the Secretary of Labor to promulgate safety and health standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655.
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if certain conditions are met.36 WISHA is Washington’s approved industrial safety plan and preempts the applicable federal law.
WISHA establishes that an employer has a duty to comply with
promulgated regulations and to furnish employees with a place of employment free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to
cause, serious injury or death to employees.37 The purpose of WISHA is
to ensure safe and healthy working conditions for every man and woman
working in the state of Washington.38
In addition to the general employer duties, WISHA adopted the
language of OSHA’s anti-discrimination statute.39 WISHA prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against any employee who
has filed a safety complaint, has testified or is planning to testify in any
WISHA proceeding, or has exercised any right afforded under WISHA.40
If an employee believes that his discharge violates these protections, he
may file a complaint with the director of the Department of Labor and
Industries within thirty days of his termination.41 Following receipt of a
complaint, the director must investigate the situation, and if the director
determines that WISHA has been violated, he or she must bring a cause
of action against the employer.42 If the director determines that the employer did not violate the statute, the employee may still bring a cause of
action on his own behalf within thirty days of the director’s determination.43 In such an action, the court may order all appropriate relief including rehiring or reinstating the employee to his or her former position with
back pay.44
B. Enforcement of WISHA
The legislature delegated the administration and enforcement of
WISHA to the Department of Labor and Industries (the Department).45 In
order to ensure the enforcement of the WISHA anti-discrimination statute, the Department promulgated regulations setting out the administrative procedure the Department uses upon receipt of a WISHA com36. 29 U.S.C. § 667; see also Alan S. Paja, The Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act:
WISHA’s Twentieth Anniversary, 1973–1993, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 259, 264 (1994).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060(1) (2010).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1973).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010).
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010).
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160(2) (2010).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.020 (2010).
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plaint.46 The Department procedures contain slight changes from the
statutory language that weaken the administrative remedies. For example, while the WISHA statute states that the director must file a cause of
action upon finding a violation, the regulation states that the Department
“may bring a civil action against the violator.”47 The regulations also delegate responsibility to the assistant director (rather than the director) for
investigation and determination of complaints.48 If the assistant director
determines that a violation has not occurred, the employee may file a
written request for review by the director within fifteen days of receipt of
the determination.49
The regulations also provide further detail regarding the timing of
complaints. WISHA provides for a thirty-day window for an employee to
file a complaint.50 The Department will presume that complaints that are
not filed within the thirty-day window are untimely and will decline to
accept them.51 There may be some circumstances, however, where the
Department will toll the thirty-day period, such as instances where the
employer has concealed or misled the employee regarding the grounds
for discharge.52
C. Wrongful Discharge Claims Under Workplace Safety Laws in
Washington
In Washington, case law involving wrongful discharge premised on
workplace safety laws has developed from early cases, in which a claim
was found to be barred by statute, to later cases allowing a claim to move
forward regardless of statutory remedies. In Jones v. Industrial ElectricSeattle, Inc., the Court of Appeals, Division II, held that WISHA “both
states a policy and affords a remedy.”53 The court pointed to language in
the statute authorizing the court to order “all appropriate relief,” and stat46. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–010 (2013).
47. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–020 (2013) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–040(2) (2013).
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160(2) (2010).
51. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–030(4) (2013).
52. Id.
53. Jones v. Indus. Elec.-Seattle, Inc., 768 P.2d 520, 522 (Wash. 1989) overruled by State v.
WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257 (Wash. 1999); see also Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
821 P.2d 18 (Wash. 1991) (disapproving of Jones). Jones was discharged after making several complaints about unsafe working conditions. Jones filed a timely complaint with the Department of
Labor and Industries and was notified that the Department would take no action following its investigation. Jones brought suit two years later, and summary judgment was granted to the defendant
because Jones did not bring the action within thirty days of the department’s determination, as required by statute.
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ed that this language indicates a comprehensive remedy with no room for
judicial legislation.54 Because the plaintiff did not bring his claim within
the statutory period, he was unable to move forward with his tort claim
of wrongful discharge.55
The Jones decision was distinguished by the Washington Supreme
Court in Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.56 The statute at
issue in Wilmot was a Washington industrial insurance statute with a
statutory remedy very similar to the WISHA statute.57 The court held that
the statute was not mandatory and exclusive and that therefore an employee “may file a tort claim for wrongful discharge . . . independent of
the statute.”58 One reason the court gave for this decision centered on the
language of the statute. Like the language in WISHA, the statute at issue
in Wilmot contained language stating that an employee who believes he
has been discriminated against may file a complaint with the director,
and upon receipt the director shall conduct an investigation.59 The court
stated that the use of the word “may” in the same provision as “shall” is
“strong evidence that the Legislature did not intend [the statute] to provide the exclusive procedure and remedies to redress retaliatory discharges resulting from exercise of a worker’s rights.”60 The court also
noted that the statute contained no language, express or implied, that
would indicate the statute was intended to be the exclusive remedy.61
Also similar to WISHA, the insurance statute contained a provision allowing an employee to file an action in court if the director finds no violation. This further strengthened the court’s view that the statute was not
the exclusive remedy.62 The court also questioned whether the statutory
54. Jones, 768 P.2d at 539.
55. Id.
56. Wilmot, 821 P.2d 18. Plaintiffs in Wilmot were twenty-two former employees who were
injured on the job and either missed work due to the injury or continued to work with an injury due
to company policy stating an employee who misses work will be terminated. Each plaintiff filed a
claim for worker’s compensation benefits and all claimed they were discharged because of their
workers’ compensation claims. None of the plaintiffs filed a claim with the Department of Labor and
Industries, as required by the statute. The employer moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute
provided an exclusive remedy, but the Washington Supreme Court held that the remedy was not
exclusive and allowed the tort claims to move forward. Id.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.48.025 (1985). The statute prohibits an employer from discharging
or discriminating against any employee because the employee has filed or communicated to the
employer an intention to file a claim for compensation. Id. The only significant difference between
the two statutes is that the industrial insurance statute provides a window of ninety days for the employee to file a claim, rather than the thirty days provided by WISHA.
58. Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 21.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.48.025(2) (1985) (emphasis added).
60. Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 22.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 23.
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remedy would provide the employee with the ability to recover all of the
same damages that he would be entitled to in a tort action, such as emotional distress damages.63
Following Wilmot, the Court of Appeals, Division I, in Wilson v.
City of Monroe considered whether WISHA was intended to provide the
exclusive and mandatory remedy.64 Noting the similarities between
WISHA and the industrial insurance statute under consideration in Wilmot, the Wilson court followed the analysis in Wilmot and determined
that WISHA was not the exclusive remedy for claims under the statute.
Therefore, the plaintiff was allowed to bring a cause of action for wrongful discharge.65 While Jones and Wilmot were both decided prior to the
Washington Supreme Court’s adoption of the four-part test in Gardner,
the Wilson case was decided after Gardner.
Several years after Wilson, the Washington Supreme Court allowed
a wrongful discharge claim to move forward under WISHA in Ellis v.
City of Seattle.66 The primary question presented for the court’s determination was whether the plaintiff must prove an actual violation of
WISHA or whether the plaintiff’s objectively reasonable belief that the
policy has been violated would suffice.67 The court held that, in the context of public health and safety, the jeopardy element may be established
by the plaintiff’s “objectively reasonable belief the law may be violated
in the absence of his or her action.”68 The court held that “to establish his
retaliation claim under RCW 49.17.160(1) . . . [a]ll he has to do is prove
63. Id. at 25.
64. Wilson v. City of Monroe, 943 P.2d 1134 (Wash. 1997). Wilson was employed by the City
of Monroe as a waste water treatment facility plant manager. Wilson filed complaints regarding
illegal discharges into the Skykomish River with the Washington State Department of Ecology and
the Environmental Protection Agency. The city terminated Wilson for poor performance, and he was
notified of his right to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement. Wilson filed a
complaint with the city and his union representative filed a grievance on his behalf, but Wilson dismissed his administrative law claims and instead chose to pursue remedies in superior court. The
court reversed summary judgment for the employer, holding that Wilson’s failure to exhaust remedies under his agreement did not preclude a wrongful discharge tort action and that WISHA did not
provide a mandatory and exclusive remedy.
65. Id. at 1140.
66. Ellis v. City of Seattle, 13 P.3d 1065 (Wash. 2000). Ellis was employed as a sound technician at the Seattle Center. Ellis raised complaints to his superior about an order to bypass a fire alarm
system and after he insisted on obtaining proper authorization before bypassing the fire alarm relay,
Ellis was suspended by the human resources manager. Ellis then made a complaint to the Department of Labor and Industries about being asked to disable part of the fire alarm system, and shortly
thereafter Ellis was discharged for gross insubordination. The Washington Supreme Court reversed
summary judgment for the employer, holding that Ellis either met all four elements or that factual
questions on the jeopardy and absence of justification elements should preclude summary judgment.
67. Id. at 1070.
68. Id. at 1071.
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the City terminated him for making a WISHA complaint”69 and allowed
the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge to move forward.
Another case involving safety and protection of workers who report
safety violations, although not based on WISHA, is Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc.70 In Korslund, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the jeopardy element because the statute upon which the plaintiffs relied provided adequate
means for promoting public policy.71 The plaintiffs asserted that a clear
public policy was established by the federal Energy Reorganization Act
(ERA), which prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating
against an employee who notified his employer of a violation of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.72 The court recognized a clear public policy
of encouraging and protecting employees who report violations without
fear of retaliation.73 However, the court identified the comprehensive
administrative remedies contained within the statute as protecting the
public policy.74 The court distinguished the Wilmot case, stating that in
Korslund, the question was “whether other means of protecting the public policy are adequate so that recognition of a tort claim in these circumstances is unnecessary to protect the public policy.”75 The court held that
the remedies under the ERA were adequate to protect public policy, and
therefore, the plaintiff’s claims for wrongful discharge failed as a matter
of law.76
D. Wrongful Discharge Under Federal and State Workplace Protection Laws Outside of Washington
Jurisdictions outside of Washington are split over whether OSHA
or comparable state laws adequately protect public policy to preclude a
common law tort claim.77 After considering this question, courts in some
states have determined that the remedial procedures that OSHA provides
69. Id.
70. Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 125 P.3d 119 (Wash. 2005).
71. Id. at 126.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 127.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See George v. D.W. Zinser Co., 762 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Iowa 2009) (“Although state courts
and circuit courts are split on the issue of whether OSHA and the state equivalents preclude common
law claims for wrongful discharge, the majority recognize the statutory remedies are not exclusive.”). See generally Monique C. Lillard, Exploring Paths to Recovery for OSHA Whistleblowers:
Section 11(c) of the OSHAct and the Public Policy Tort, 6 EMPL. RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 329 (2002);
Occ. Safety & Health L. § 20:1 (2011 ed.); 75 A.L.R.4th 13 § 3 (Originally published in 1989).
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are inadequate to protect the public policy of workplace safety. The reasons given for allowing a common law claim to move forward are, generally, that OSHA does not explicitly preclude a state common law tort
claim; that the OSHA filing procedures are too limited to adequately protect public policy; that terminating an employee who has reported a safety complaint is an affront to safety concerns; and that the potential to deter other employees from reporting issues is too great to justify precluding a claim.78
In states that have determined that OSHA provides an adequate
statutory remedy, courts have stated that the plaintiff’s common law
claim is precluded. Those courts generally indicate that the common law
claim must fail because the statute specifies the civil remedy available to
an employee who is alleging wrongful termination.79
Federal courts are also split over whether OSHA provides adequate
remedies.80 The public policy exception is a state common law tort and is
not based on federal law, so any federal court analyzing the adequacy of
statutory remedies will be evaluating the state common law and will thus
split along the same state lines discussed above.
IV. WASHINGTON’S DUI LAWS
This Part discusses Washington’s statutes criminalizing driving
while under the influence of alcohol and the penalties and remedies
available under the statutes.
78. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 168 (Ct. App. 1982) (“We do not find .
. . an intent on the part of the Legislature to preclude an employee from suing on his own behalf.”);
Flenker v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 967 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1998) (finding an “employee’s remedy for
wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing complaint under OSHA . . . is inadequate”); Cerracchio v.
Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d 1292, 1298–99 (N.J. App. Div. 1988) (“retaliation against the reporting
employee as a punitive measure and as a deterrent to other observers of unsafe conditions, directly
affronts our policy in favor of safety”); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 323–24
(Ohio 1997) (“such retaliatory practices could deter employees from reporting what they believe to
be legitimate health and safety concerns. . . .”).
79. See, e.g., Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 184 (Conn. 2000) (“because the
plaintiff had a remedy under 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) for the retaliatory discharge she had alleged, she
was not ‘otherwise without [a] remedy’ and her common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge
is precluded”); Benningfield v. Pettit Envtl., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (“the
statute provides both the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to aggrieved parties”);
Franklin v. Clarke, CIV. 1O–00382–CL, 2011 WL 4024638 (D. Or. Sept. 9, 2011) (“Because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy in his state statutory whistle-blower claims, his wrongful discharge
claim is precluded.”).
80. Compare Miles v. Martin Marietta Corp., 861 F. Supp. 73, 74 (D. Colo. 1994) (“Colorado
law is clear that a separate public policy wrongful discharge claim is not available where the statute
at issue provides a wrongful discharge remedy.”), with Kohrt v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 364 F.3d
894, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that Iowa common law allows a wrongful discharge claim
under OSHA remedial schemes).
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In Washington, it is illegal for a person to drive or physically control a vehicle if the person has a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or higher
or is under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug.81 A violation
of the statute is generally a gross misdemeanor.82 Penalties for violators
include mandatory imprisonment and a mandatory fine.83 Any person
convicted of violating the statute may also be required to apply for an
ignition interlock device, which prevents the vehicle from starting when
the driver’s breath sample has an alcohol concentration of 0.025 or higher.84
In spite of the existing criminal penalties for driving while under
the influence, drunk driving remains a problem. The Washington Traffic
Safety Commission (WTSC) ranks impaired driving prevention as a top
priority because impaired driving is a leading factor in traffic fatalities.85
The WTSC reports that between 2004 and 2008, there were 1,221 fatal
crashes involving impaired driving, resulting in a total of 1,363 fatalities.86 In 2009 alone, Washington reported 492 total traffic fatalities, 42%
of which involved a driver with blood alcohol content above 0.08.87
The WTSC uses several mechanisms to enforce Washington’s DUI
laws, including expanded DUI patrols, public awareness campaigns, and
law enforcement training.88 However, there are no statutory “whistleblower” protections available for someone who reports impaired driving.
Thus, if an employee is terminated for reporting impaired driving, that
81. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.502 (2013), 46.61.504 (2013).
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502(5) (2013). Driving under the influence is a class C felony if
(a) the person has four or more prior offenses within ten years; or (b) the person has previously been
convicted of vehicular homicide while under the influence or vehicular assault while under the influence. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502(6) (2013).
83. Penalties depend upon the blood alcohol level of the offender and whether this is his or her
first violation of the statute. A first-time offender with alcohol concentration below 0.15 will be
imprisoned for between 1 to 364 days and fined between $350 and $5,000. WASH. REV. CODE §
46.61.5055(1)(a) (2012). A first-time offender with alcohol concentration equal to or above 0.15 will
be imprisoned for between 2 to 364 days and fined between $500 and $5,000. WASH. REV. CODE §
46.61.5055(1)(b) (2012). Prior offenders will have both increased minimum jail sentences as well as
increased minimum fines. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.5055(2)–(3) (2012).
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.5055(5) (2012).
85. Programs and Priorities: Impaired Driving, WASH. TRAFFIC SAFETY COMMISSION
http://www.wtsc.wa.gov/programs-priorities/impaired-driving/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). The
WTSC defines “impaired driving” as driving while under the influence of drugs, while impaired by
alcohol, or with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or above. Id.
86. WASH. TRAFFIC SAFETY COMM’N, Fatal Crashes Involving Impairment in Washington,
2004 – 2008 (2009), available at http://www.wtsc.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads
/2010/02/dui092.pdf.
87. Fatality Analysis Reporting System, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.
http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/States/StatesAlcohol.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2013).
88. Programs and Priorities: Impaired Driving, supra note 85.
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employee has no statutory remedy available under the DUI laws to protest his termination.
V. APPLICATION OF THE COMMON LAW TORT IN CUDNEY V. ALSCO, INC.
This Part discusses the facts of the Cudney case and the reasoning
of both the majority and dissent in analyzing the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Matthew Cudney was hired by ALSCO in April of 2004 as service
manager of its Spokane branch.89 During his employment with ALSCO,
Cudney complained numerous times to his supervisor about the alcohol
use of John Bartich, the general manager of the Spokane branch.90 On
June 10, 2008, Cudney reported to his supervisor and the human resources manager that he believed Bartich to be intoxicated at work:
Cudney stated that Bartich was weaving back and forth, had slurred
speech and glazed eyes, and smelled of alcohol.91 Cudney then observed
Bartich drive off in a company vehicle.92 On August 5, 2008, Cudney
was terminated from his job.93
Cudney filed an action in Spokane Superior Court claiming that he
was terminated in retaliation for reporting Bartich’s drinking and driving
and that his discharge was a clear contravention of public policy.94
Cudney pointed to WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws as two sources
showing the public policy in Washington to be protected.95 ALSCO removed to federal court and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Washington certified two questions to the Washington State Supreme
Court.96 The Eastern District asked the Washington Supreme Court to
determine whether WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws adequately
promote Washington’s public policies so as to preclude a separate claim
for wrongful discharge.97

89. Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 245 (Wash. 2011).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 245–246.
95. Id. at 246.
96. Id. at 245.
97. Id.
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The only issue presented for the court’s consideration was the
“jeopardy” element.98 The court had to determine “whether current laws
and regulations provide an adequate means of promoting the public policies of ensuring workplace safety, protecting against retaliation for reporting safety violations, and protecting the public from the dangers of
drinking and driving.”99
In addition to the briefs submitted by the parties to the case, the
Department of Labor and Industries, the Washington Employment Lawyers Association (WELA), and the Washington State Association for
Justice Foundation (WSAJ Foundation) each filed amicus curiae
briefs.100 All three amici argued that the court should hold that a common
law cause of action for wrongful discharge was available under the
WISHA statute.101 While the Department’s brief discussed only the first
question (regarding WISHA), the WSAJ Foundation urged the court to
answer no to both certified questions.102
The Department of Labor and Industries’ brief argued that the remedies provided by WISHA are inadequate to protect public policy.103 As
the agency responsible for administering and enforcing WISHA, the Department is very familiar with the rights and remedies available under the
statute. When discussing the regulatory scheme, the Department asserted
that there is no citation or penalty assessed by the Department if it determines that a violation has occurred.104 Instead, the Department refers
the matter to the Attorney General’s Office to file an action in court.105
The Department argued that the court had recognized a tort for wrongful
discharge in Wilmot and that the court should not revisit the issue without

98. Id. at 246. The clarity element was undisputed because the parties stipulated that WISHA
establishes a clear public policy of ensuring the safety of workers and protecting those who report
workplace safety violations and that the DUI laws establish the clear public policy of protecting the
public from drunk drivers. Id. at 247 n.1. The court was not asked to decide the causation and absence of justification elements as those are fact-specific inquiries. Id.
99. Id. at 247.
100. Brief for Department of Labor & Industries as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter L&I Brief]; Brief
for Washington Employment Lawyers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cudney v.
ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter WELA Brief]; Brief for Washington State Ass’n for Justice Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cudney v.
ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter WSAJF Brief].
101. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *8–10; WELA Brief, supra note 100, at *3–4; WSAJF
Brief, supra note 100, at *5–6.
102. WSAJF Brief, supra note 100, at *17, *25.
103. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *8.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
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a change in the statute.106 The Department also argued that the WISHA
remedy was inadequate under either a Wilmot or Korslund analysis.107
The WSAJ Foundation argued that the court should allow a claim
to move forward under both WISHA and the DUI laws. They argued that
when the employee’s conduct directly relates to the public policy in
question, the employee should not be required to show that his conduct
was necessary for the enforcement of the public policy.108 Following this
line of reasoning, they argued that Cudney’s action in reporting his suspicions was directly related to the WISHA public policy, and therefore,
the jeopardy element was satisfied.109 In the alternative, WSAJ also argued that if the plaintiff must show the inadequacy of other remedies,
Cudney would still prevail because the remedies under WISHA are inadequate.110 Finally, the WSAJ argued that criminal prosecutions are not an
adequate means of promoting the public policy embodied in the DUI
laws and that therefore actions such as reporting suspected impaired
drivers is necessary for the effective enforcement of DUI laws.111
WELA also argued in favor of the plaintiff on both questions. Regarding the WISHA question, WELA argued that WISHA was not intended as the exclusive means of protection and that the administrative
scheme is not an adequate means of vindicating public policy.112 WELA
obtained data from the Department of Labor and Industries showing that
13.8% of cases received by the Department are rejected as untimely and
argued that the thirty-day filing period did not provide an adequate alternative means.113 Finally, WELA reasoned that criminal statutes are seldom an adequate means for protecting public policy due to the lack of
remedies for the employee who exposes a violation.114
Ultimately, a narrow majority of the Washington Supreme Court
answered that both WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws adequately
promote public policy, and therefore, a separate claim of action is precluded.115

106. Id. at *5.
107. Id. at *8, *10.
108. WSAJF Brief, supra note 100, at *8.
109. Id. at *17–18.
110. Id. at *19–20.
111. Id. at *20–21.
112. WELA Brief, supra note 100, at *14–20.
113. Id. at *19–20.
114. Id. at *10.
115. Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 250 (Wash. 2011).
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B. The Washington Supreme Court’s Holding
In Cudney, the majority held that WISHA and its accompanying
regulations adequately protected the identified public policy. The court
set out three reasons for its determination that “WISHA’s retaliation statute provides extensive protections to employees who claim that they suffered retaliation for filing complaints related to workplace safety.”116
First, the statute prohibits employers from discharging employees for
exercising any WISHA rights.117 Second, the statute provides a complaint filing and investigation procedure, which results in the director
filing an action on the employee’s behalf if he or she determines a violation has occurred.118 Even if the director does not determine a violation
has occurred, the employee may still bring a suit on his own behalf.119
Regardless of who files the suit, the superior court is authorized to order
all appropriate relief.120 Finally, the court noted that the superior court is
not limited to the relief specifically mentioned in the statute.121
The court found Korslund to be controlling in its determination of
the adequacy of WISHA’s remedies in promoting the public policy. In
Korslund, the court held that the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
(ERA) provided comprehensive remedies that adequately promoted the
public policy, precluding the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim.122 In
comparing the ERA to WISHA, the Cudney court noted that both statutes
provide for agency investigations and determinations, and both allow the
plaintiff to bring their own claim if the agency does not take action.123
The ERA sets out what remedies the secretary should take if it determines that a violation has occurred; in contrast, WISHA does not set out
specific remedies, but does grant the superior court power to order all
appropriate relief.124 The court stated that by not determining specific
remedies, “WISHA is actually more comprehensive than the ERA and is
more than adequate.”125 The court found Cudney’s argument that the

116. Id. at 247.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 248.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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thirty-day filing deadline contained in WISHA makes the statute inadequate to protect public policy meritless.126
Although not overruling any prior cases, the court did distinguish
Cudney from both Wilmot and Ellis and disapproved any implication in
either case that WISHA does not adequately promote public policy.127
The court noted that Wilmot was not controlling here, even though a statute similar to WISHA was considered, because the focus in Wilmot was
on whether the statute was the mandatory and exclusive remedy, not
whether the statute was adequate to promote the public policy.128 Moreover, the court noted that Wilmot preceded the articulation of the four-part
test in Gardner by five years and that in cases since Gardner, the court
had said “the plaintiff must show that other means of promoting the public policy are inadequate.”129 The court therefore determined that Wilmot
was not on point in determining the outcome in this case.130 The court
found that Ellis was not determinative because the court in Ellis did not
address whether WISHA adequately promoted public policy in answering the questions presented by the parties in that case.131
Based upon the Korslund analysis, and distinguishing Wilmot and
Ellis, the court held that WISHA’s statutory remedies are adequate in
promoting public policy; thus, the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the
jeopardy element required for a claim of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy.132
The court also held that Cudney was unable to show that current
DUI laws were inadequate to protect public policy. In order to prevail,
the court stated that Cudney had to show that reporting suspected drunk
driving to his manager was the “only available adequate means” to promote the public policy.133 In light of the criminal laws, enforcement
mechanism, and penalties, the court held that Cudney’s conduct was a
“roundabout remedy that is highly unlikely to protect the public from the
immediate problem of a drunk driver on its roads.”134 The court finally
126. Id. at 248–49. The court reasoned that an employee has immediate notice of a discharge
and would know that he had recently raised a safety concern, so requiring the employee to file a
complaint within thirty days of the discharge does not make the statutory remedy inadequate. Id. The
court also pointed out the potential to toll the thirty-day period under certain circumstances as another factor in its determination. Id.
127. Id. at 249–50.
128. Id. at 249.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 250.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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stated that the “other means of promoting the public policy need not be
available to a particular individual so long as the other means are adequate to safeguard the public policy.”135 The court therefore held that
“Cudney has not shown that the current DUI laws are an inadequate
means of promoting the public policy, so his claim fails.”136
C. The Dissent’s Reasoning
Justice Stephens, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, Justice Chambers and Justice Pro Tem Sanders, dissented. The dissent would have
answered no to both certified questions and allowed Cudney’s claim to
move forward under both WISHA and the DUI laws.137 In analyzing
WISHA, Justice Stephens argued that the court should not change its
interpretation of a statute that has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1973.138 The dissent argued that Wilmot was instructive in deciding this case and questioned both of the majority’s assertions that Wilmot
and Korslund contemplated different issues and that Wilmot was outdated.139 Although Wilmot was decided before the court established the
Gardner four-part test, the Gardner court stated that the “adoption of this
test does not change the existing common law in this state.”140 Moreover,
the dissent noted that had the court felt the reasoning in Wilmot was unsound, it could have rejected the Wilmot analysis in deciding Ellis, which
was decided several years after the Gardner decision.141 The Ellis court,
however, solidified the Wilmot reasoning by citing Wilson with approval,
which recognized WISHA as the basis for a public policy tort claim.142
The dissent noted in dicta that, even if the question had not been
decided in Wilmot, the court should still allow a claim to move forward
because the remedies under WISHA are inadequate to promote the public
135. Id. (quoting Hubbard v. Spokane County, 50 P.3d 602, 611 (Wash. 2002)).
136. Id. at 250–51.
137. Id. at 256 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 255.
139. Id. at 253.
140. Id. at 251 (quoting Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996)).
141. Id. at 253–54. The dissent points out that the Ellis court “expressly addressed the jeopardy
prong and held that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding as a matter of law that Ellis’s conduct
was not necessary to enforce the public policy at issue.” Id. at 254. Furthermore, the dissent notes
that the Ellis analysis “echoed Professor Perritt’s view that ‘public policy tort cases involving employee reports of employer misconduct to outside agencies present relatively strong arguments on
the jeopardy element, because of the likelihood that agencies charged with public policy enforcement depend on such reports.’” Id. (quoting PERRITT, supra note 17, § 3.34). Finally, the dissent
argued that the Ellis decision solidified the existence of a public policy claim under WISHA, regardless of statutory remedies, by citing Wilson with approval. Id.
142. Id. at 254.
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policy at issue.143 The dissent’s arguments are supported by several limitations on the WISHA remedies. First, assuming a claim has merit, the
Department will bring the action in court, but the Department does not
represent the employee.144 Second, while the statute authorizes the court
to grant all appropriate relief, the Department “does not plead compensatory damages, including emotional distress damages, or front pay.”145
Finally, the dissent identified the thirty-day filing period as “the most
striking feature of the WISHA administrative scheme that renders the
statutory remedy inadequate.”146
While the majority characterized the thirty-day filing period as
enough time for an employee to bring a claim, the dissent pointed to other court decisions holding that shortened filing periods are substantively
unconscionable.147 The dissent argued that an employee may not know
the true reason for the termination right away, especially if the employee
is not given any reason at all.148 While WISHA regulations allow for tolling of the thirty-day period if the employer concealed or misled the employee, it does not allow for tolling if the employer provides no reason
for the termination.149 The dissent found it “unrealistic . . . to expect that
within 30 days of getting a pink slip an employee will be able to find and
hire a lawyer, investigate the real reason for his or her termination, and
file suit.”150
Although the majority relied on Korslund in analyzing the adequacy of WISHA remedies, the dissent argued that the remedies provided by
the ERA are quite different than WISHA and that the majority’s reliance
on Korslund was misplaced.151 The ERA establishes an administrative
process for adjudicating complaints and provides comprehensive remedies including reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and attorney and expert witness fees.152 In contrast, WISHA does not contain
any administrative process for reviewing and adjudicating complaints,153
and does not provide the same remedies for the plaintiff.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 254 (citing L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *10–12).
146. Id. at 254.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 255.
149. Id. Under the at-will doctrine, an employer is not required to give a reason for termination.
150. Id. at 255.
151. Id. at 254.
152. Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 127 (Wash. 2005).
153. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *19.
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The dissent concluded that the remedies provided by WISHA are
inadequate and that this should be considered evidence of the legislature’s intent for WISHA to supplement the existing private cause of action.154 The dissent argued that the court should follow Wilmot and Ellis
and allow the tort claim to move forward.
The dissent also argued that Cudney’s claim under the DUI laws
should be allowed to move forward and that the existence of a criminal
enforcement mechanism does not necessarily preclude the claim.155 For
the dissent, the key question in determining whether public policy would
be jeopardized was if an employee could be fired for reporting violations.156 The dissent argued that “[r]elying solely upon the criminal law
mechanism for enforcement of the DUI laws thus leaves the enforcement
of the public policy uncertain” and that the certified question should be
answered no, allowing Cudney’s claim to move forward.157
D. The Motion for Reconsideration
Following the court’s decision, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 21, 2011.158 The motion was supported by
Professor Henry Perritt, WELA, and the WSAJ Foundation.159 The defendant filed an answer on January 12, 2012, and the court denied the
motion on March 5, 2012.
VI. FLAWS IN THE MAJORITY’S REASONING AND POTENTIAL FUTURE
IMPACT OF THE COURT’S DECISION
This Part contends that the majority opinion erred in determining
that WISHA adequately protected the public policy of providing safe
workplaces and protecting workers who report safety concerns and that
the majority opinion incorrectly determined that Washington’s DUI laws
precluded a cause of action for wrongful discharge. This Part also discusses the impact the Cudney decision will have on future wrongful dis154. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 255 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 256.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Motion for Reconsideration, Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No.
83124–6).
159. Amicus Curiae Memorandum by Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and the Washington Employment
Lawyers Ass’n, Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter
WELA ACM]; Washington State Ass’n for Justice Foundation Amicus Curiae Memorandum on
Reconsideration, Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter
WSAJF ACM]. Professor Perritt, who articulated the four-part test adopted by the court in Gardner,
is an expert on this topic and often quoted by the court. He co-authored the WELA ACM.
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charge cases under WISHA and other statutes. Finally, this Part argues
that the Washington legislature should consider enacting remedial legislation and that the Washington Supreme Court should consider redefining the narrow boundaries of the common law exception in a future case.
A. The Majority Erred in Holding that WISHA Adequately Protects
Public Policy
The majority’s holding that WISHA adequately protected public
policy is incorrect for three reasons. First, the thirty-day filing period
provided by WISHA is inadequate and does not account for the realities
that a terminated employee faces following a discharge. Second, the administrative remedies provided by WISHA are not sufficiently robust
and are not comparable to the statutory scheme the court found to be adequate in Korslund. Third, even if an employee does file a claim within
the thirty-day period and the Department does file a suit on the employee’s behalf, the potential remedies for that cause of action are not equal
to what an employee could recover under a public policy tort claim.
1. The Thirty-Day Filing Period: An Unreasonable Remedy
As opposed to a public policy tort claim, which has a three-year
statute of limitations, an employee who is terminated in violation of
WISHA is allowed only thirty days to file a claim with the Department
of Labor and Industries. Although the majority found thirty days to be
plenty of time for a terminated worker to file a complaint, the opinion
overlooked the practical realities that a terminated employee is faced
with following a job loss. The immediate concerns for most terminated
workers will revolve around finding a new job, applying for unemployment, arranging for health insurance, managing finances, and dealing
with the emotional strain that accompanies a termination. These activities
may extend well beyond the first thirty days of termination. Even an employee who immediately decides to pursue legal action will find it difficult, within thirty days, to “find and hire a lawyer, investigate the real
reason for his or her termination, and file suit.”160
In addition to these practical issues, a thirty-day filing period
should be considered legally inadequate as well. As noted by the dissent
in Cudney, the Washington Supreme Court held a claim-filing period of
180 days to be substantively unconscionable in the context of employer–
employee arbitration contracts.161 In that context, the court held that by
160. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 255 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 254.
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limiting the period in which an employee can bring a claim, the employer
gains an unfair advantage and the employee may be forced to forgo the
opportunity to file a claim.162 While the arbitration contract context involves a contract between the employer and employee, it seems ridiculous to suggest that it is unconscionable to limit an employee to a 180day filing period, but that a thirty-day limitation for claims under
WISHA is adequate.
Finally, the fact that the thirty-day filing period is unreasonable can
be inferred from the number of potential claims that are rejected by the
Department of Labor and Industries because of the thirty-day filing period. Between 2004 and 2009, the Department rejected 112 out of 807
claims because they were untimely.163 This figure does not account for
any additional cases that “were never filed with L&I because the complainant learned of the 30 day limit after the time had expired.”164
2. WISHA Does Not Provide a Robust Statutory Scheme Like the ERA
The majority also erred in determining that WISHA provided robust statutory remedies that were as comprehensive as the remedies provided under the ERA.165 The administrative schemes created by the two
statutes are remarkably different, and the majority ignored key components of the ERA that enhance that statute’s ability to serve as a comprehensive remedy. Both statutes prohibit discrimination against an employee who reports violations and allow the employee to file a complaint if
he believes he has been subject to discrimination.166 But one of the most
striking differences is that under WISHA, if the director determines a
violation has occurred, he must bring a cause of action against the employer in court.167 In contrast, if the Secretary of Labor (the Secretary)
determines a violation of the ERA has occurred, the Secretary has the
power to order the employer to reinstate the employee, provide compensatory damages, and assess attorney’s fees against the employer.168 Thus

162. Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 787 (Wash. 2004).
163. WELA Brief, supra note 100, at *16.
164. Id. at *19.
165. The majority actually stated that WISHA remedies were more comprehensive than the
remedies under the ERA because WISHA does not set out specific remedies available. Cudney, 259
P.3d at 248.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010).
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160(2) (2010). However, in practice L&I will refer the matter
to the Attorney General’s Office. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *3.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B) (2010). The statute provides that reinstatement requires compensation (including back pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment. Id.
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under WISHA, all that is granted is a cause of action, whereas under
ERA, the Secretary can directly authorize a remedy.
The ERA and WISHA also differ in the filing period allowed by the
statute. Under the ERA, an employee has 180 days following a discharge
to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.169 The Secretary has thirty days to complete an investigation into the complaint and must either
issue an order providing relief or dismiss the complaint within ninety
days of receipt.170 If the Secretary has not issued a final order within one
year after the filing of the complaint, the employee may bring an action
in district court for de novo review.171 As discussed above, WISHA only
allows an employee thirty days to file a complaint with the Department
of Labor and Industries.172 Thus, the WISHA filing period is significantly
shorter than the period available under the ERA.
3. The Department of Labor and Industries Does Not Claim All Potential Remedies
The majority’s determination that WISHA is an adequate remedy is
also erroneous because the administrative agency tasked with enforcing
WISHA does not provide an employee filer with the full complement of
remedies available under the common law tort claim. In a suit instituted
by the Department of Labor and Industries, the Department only seeks
the remedies explicitly provided for in the statute, such as back wages
and reinstatement.173 The Department does not plead other damages that
an employee may recover in a tort claim, such as compensatory damages
or front pay.174 The majority relied on the fact that the statute authorizes
the court to grant “all appropriate relief” in concluding that the remedies
are adequate.175 But if the agency bringing the claim does not plead those
types of remedies,176 and is not truly representing the plaintiff,177 then the
court cannot reasonably expect that a full array of remedies will be provided to a wrongfully discharged employee. Maintaining all potential
remedies would effectuate public policy by encouraging and protecting
employees who report wrongful conduct. If the employee does not have
169. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1) (2010).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A) (2010).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(4) (2010).
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160(2) (2010).
173. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *11.
174. Id.
175. Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 248 (Wash. 2011).
176. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *11.
177. Id. The L&I Brief states that the Department will bring suit to fulfill its statutory duties
but that the “Department does not represent the complainant.” Id.
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access to all remedies available to him, he is being penalized for engaging in conduct that public policy and statute asks him to do.
B. DUI Laws Are Inadequate to Protect Public Policy and Contain No
Remedy for Employees
As discussed in Part IV of this Note, impaired driving is a serious
problem in Washington State, and impaired drivers were involved in the
majority of fatal car accidents.178 Even though drivers caught while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs face serious criminal penalties, the
criminal statutes have not fully eliminated the problem.179 Because current statutes and enforcement mechanisms have not solved the problem
of impaired driving, the majority erroneously concluded that Washington’s DUI laws are adequate to protect public policy.
In addition to the general inadequacy of the criminal statutes, the
court also erred in determining that Cudney’s claim was barred regardless of the lack of a remedy for the employee. The majority concluded
that it is “the public policy that must be promoted, not Cudney’s individual interests. ‘The other means of promoting the public policy need not
be available to a particular individual so long as the other means are adequate to safeguard the public policy.’”180
However, this conclusion undermines the purpose of the public policy exception. The Washington State Supreme Court adopted the public
policy exception because it properly balanced the interests of employees
and employers.181 In his treatise, Professor Perritt argued that the exception required courts to balance employee, employer, and societal interests.182 The majority opinion in Cudney erred in ignoring the balancing of
these interests.
The four-part test ensures this balancing by only allowing an employee to prevail when he meets all four elements (clarity, jeopardy, causation, and absence of justification).183 The interests of society in protecting public policy are represented because an employee must show a clear
mandate of public policy and that his conduct directly relates or was necessary to protect that public policy. The interest of employers in freely
running their businesses is represented by requiring that the discharge be
178. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
180. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 249 (quoting Hubbard v. Spokane Cnty., 50 P.3d 602, 611 (Wash.
2002)).
181. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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caused by the conduct and by requiring that the employer not have a legitimate justification. In Cudney, the majority focused so narrowly on the
certified question of the adequacy of the two Washington statutes that it
failed to consider the interests of the employer or employee. Furthermore, the court did not consider the interests of society beyond the rote
enforcement of the statutes. This failure led to the erroneous conclusion
that Cudney’s claims were barred due to alternative means of protecting
public policy.
C. Impact on Future Wrongful Discharge Claims
One of the immediate consequences of the court’s decision in
Cudney is that it precludes any future plaintiffs from raising a claim of
wrongful discharge when the public policy violated arises from WISHA.
In many cases, a terminated employee will not file a complaint with the
Department of Labor and Industries within the thirty-day filing requirement.184 For those employees, a wrongful discharge claim will necessarily fail unless the plaintiff can provide an alternative public policy consideration that is not supported by statutory remedies like those contained
in WISHA. The practical effect of this decision will be to keep plaintiffs
with meritorious cases out of court and to potentially silence future whistleblowers that would have otherwise reported wrongful conduct.
Another potential impact on the common law tort may arise if the
court utilizes the Korslund and Cudney analysis when determining
whether statutes with similar remedial language sufficiently protect public policy. As discussed above, the workers compensation statute at issue
in Wilmot contains an anti-discrimination statute that mirrors WISHA.185
Based on the majority’s analysis in Cudney, it is quite possible that a reviewing court will determine that the workers compensation statute adequately protects public policy so as to preclude a common law tort claim
by a discharged employee. This is especially true in light of the fact that
the workers compensation statute has an even longer filing period—
ninety days instead of the thirty-day period provided by WISHA.186 The
workers compensation statute is the only statute that shares the same remedial language as WISHA.
The future impact of the court’s analysis regarding the DUI laws
creates perhaps even greater concerns. The court’s opinion in Cudney
“appears to rule that criminal statutes are an adequate alternative means
184. WELA Brief, supra note 100, at *19.
185. See supra note 57.
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.48.025 (1985).
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of vindicating public policy even where the reporting employee can be
retaliated against by the employer with impunity. . . . Washington State
will be the only state . . . which applies the common law claim in that
way.” 187 By determining that a cause of action was precluded because
the DUI laws adequately protected public policy, the court has potentially foreclosed a claim for any employee who reports illegal conduct to his
employer and is subsequently discharged. All criminal activity has a
statute that will proscribe the conduct and provide penalties for offenders. Crimes also have an enforcement mechanism, such as the police and
the justice system. Under the Cudney analysis, an employer who discharges an employee for reporting illegal conduct can point to the criminal statute and to the police force, and argue that the employer is free
from liability. This cannot be the outcome the court intended. Without a
private cause of action, there is no remedy for a wrongfully discharged
employee, and therefore, there is a disincentive for an employee to report
illegal conduct.188
D. Two Suggestions for Reopening the Door
1. The Washington Legislature Should Adopt Remedial Legislation to
Provide for a Private Cause of Action Outside of the Filing Period
With the Cudney decision, the court has foreclosed any wrongful
discharge claims premised off workplace safety violations under WISHA
or reporting criminal activity under Washington’s DUI laws. The court’s
analysis has also potentially precluded claims under other workplace or
criminal statutes. This decision has removed an important tool in ensuring that public policy is protected. To ensure that employers are not allowed to terminate employees in violation of public policy, the Washington State Legislature should adopt remedial legislation that creates a civil
cause of action for a termination in violation of a clear mandate of public
policy.
a. Proposed Senate Bill 6072
In the 2012 regular session, the Washington State Senate heard
proposed Senate Bill 6072 (SB 6072).189 SB 6072 would prohibit em187. WELA ACM, supra note 159, at 9.
188. Without common law protection, employees will be deterred from exposing or objecting
to criminal violations, which is the very type of protected conduct the common law cause of action
was designed to encourage. Id. at 8.
189. There was a public hearing on SB 6072 on November 29, 2011, in the Senate Committee
on Judiciary, and the bill was first read on January 11, 2012, and referred to the Committee on Judi-

2052

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:2025

ployers from taking “materially adverse action against an employee or
independent contractor where retaliation is a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to take action.”190 If enacted, the new statute would
provide a civil cause of action for any employee or independent contractor who has been retaliated against for conduct “that the employee or
independent contract reasonably believes promotes a clear mandate of
any public policy.”191 The new cause of action is independent of a common law action and is available regardless of the “existence of any other
. . . statutory or administrative means of protecting public policy,” and
provides for a three year statute of limitations.192 An employee bringing a
cause of action can “recover actual damages . . . together with . . . reasonable attorneys’ fees and any other appropriate remedy authorized by
the Washington law against discrimination.”193 While the proposed legislation would certainly ameliorate any effects of the court’s decision in
Cudney, the scope of the bill creates broader employee protections than
those provided under the common law tort.
SB 6072 is not simply a codification of the pre-Cudney common
law tort of wrongful discharge. Some elements are familiar, such as the
requirement of a “clear mandate of any public policy.”194 Yet SB 6072
extends protections farther than the common law tort, covering both employees and independent contractors for a cause of action after any materially adverse action by the employer,195 not just a discharge. Employee
advocates would argue that this broadening is appropriate to ensure that
public policy and employee interests are protected. But the expansion
neglects to account for the interests of the employer, or the societal interests in allowing the free movement of labor and the unfettered management of a business. The court has recognized the need to balance interests of the employer, employee, and society, and the Washington State
Legislature should do the same in considering remedial legislation.
b. Proposal for Narrower Legislation
To ensure the interests of all parties are properly balanced, the legislature should enact narrow remedial legislation that would create a civil
ciary. Committee Meeting Documents, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE http://apps.leg.wa.gov/
billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=6072&year=2011 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). Full text of the bill is
available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6072.pdf.
190. S.B. 6072, § 2, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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cause of action for any employee who has been constructively or actually
discharged in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. The new
cause of action should adopt many of the constraints of the common law
tort of wrongful discharge. The burden of proof would be on the employee to prove that a clear public policy exists, that the employee’s conduct
was either directly related to the public policy or was necessary for effective enforcement of the public policy, and that there is a causal relationship between the employee’s conduct and the termination. Several aspects of SB 6072 could also be incorporated into a narrow remedial statute. The cause of action should be available regardless of other statutory
or administrative remedies available to the employee and a three-year
statute of limitations should apply. In addition, the employee should be
able to recover actual damages, attorney’s fees, and any other appropriate
remedy the court shall deem necessary, such as reinstatement or injunctions against future action.
This narrow remedial legislative scheme will encompass many of
the important employee protections that were once available to Washington employees under a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. By the enactment of this statute, an employer will
not be allowed to discharge an employee with impunity when that discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Thus society’s competing interests in the promotion of public policy and the free flow of labor
are balanced with the employer’s desire to run its business free of unnecessary judicial interference and with the employee’s interest in employment.
While this legislation is narrow in the sense that it limits recovery
to only an actual or constructive discharge, it is nevertheless broader than
protections offered in some other states. For instance, some states prohibit an employer from discharging or retaliating only against an employee
who reports a violation of law.196 New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee
Protection Act (CEPA) falls on the other side of the spectrum and provides a very large amount of protection for employees. CEPA prohibits
any retaliatory action against an employee who reports or refuses to par196. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31–51m(b) (prohibiting discharge or discipline
against any employee who reports a violation of any state or federal law or regulation to a public
body); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34–01–20(1)(a) (prohibiting discharge or discipline against an
employee who reports a violation of law to the employer, government body, or law enforcement
official); see also Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, What Constitutes Activity of Private-Sector
Employee Protected Under State Whistleblower Protection Statute Covering Employee’s “Report,”
“Disclosure,” “Notification,” or the Like of Wrongdoing—Nature of Activity Reported, 36
A.L.R.6th 203 (Originally published in 2008) (discussing the scope of activity covered by state
whistleblower protection statutes).
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ticipate in activity that is a violation of law, fraudulent or criminal activity, or is “incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning
the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.”197
The Washington legislature should narrowly tailor remedial legislation to maintain the balance of power between employers and employees
in Washington State. A broad worker protection statute is unnecessary.
In order to ensure that employers are free to run their businesses as they
see fit, but that employees are protected from discharge in contravention
of a clear mandate of public policy, the legislature should enact narrow
remedial legislation creating a private cause of action.
2. Washington Supreme Court Should Reverse the Cudney Decision in
a Future Wrongful Discharge Case
For the reasons discussed above, the Washington Supreme Court
erred in holding that WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws adequately
promote public policy so as to foreclose a common law cause of action.
The Cudney decision created uncertainty regarding the new scope of the
common law public policy exception. The court did not eliminate the
exception as a cause of action and continued to utilize the four-part
Perritt framework in its analysis. However, by determining that both the
WISHA administrative scheme and the DUI enforcement mechanisms
adequately protected their respective public policies, it is still unclear
when the court will apply the exception. While unlikely, the ideal outcome would be for the court to reverse Cudney upon its next consideration of the public policy exception.198 Barring a reversal, the court should
provide clear guidance for when a cause of action exists under the narrow confines of the Cudney decision.
3. Counterarguments and a Response
Supporters of the Cudney decision may argue that the court was
correct in its holding because the public policy exception is narrow, and
the court was right to limit its reach. Supporters would likely make two
main arguments. First, remedial legislation is unnecessary because employees are already protected by both statutory remedies and common
law exceptions. Second, the court should let the Cudney decision stand
because it properly narrowed the public policy exception to only those
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19–3 (2006).
198. Although the court does not easily reverse prior decisions, one fact does make this a viable (though not necessarily probable) suggestion. The case was decided by a very narrow split, and
one of the justices who joined the majority, Justice Alexander, retired from the court. There is no
way to know at this time how his departure will affect the balance of the court on future cases.
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situations where other adequate means of protecting the public policy do
not exist. Each of these arguments is addressed below.
a. Necessity of Remedial Legislation
Many employers and proponents of the Cudney decision may argue
that there is no need for the Washington State Legislature to entertain the
proposal for remedial legislation. They would argue that employees are
already protected in many ways by statute, such as the antidiscrimination statute in WISHA. The argument maintains that Cudney
could have filed a timely complaint with the Department of Labor and
Industries, had his complaint investigated, and then filed suit if the Department chose not to pursue action. Proponents would argue that providing Cudney with another avenue for remedy is unnecessary when a statutory remedy already exists.
What this argument fails to account for is that when a statutory
remedy or administrative scheme does not fully protect the employee, as
it did not here, the public policy is threatened regardless of what statutory remedies the employee may have available. In this situation, the interests of society in protecting public policy will weigh heavily in favor of
the employee. With narrowly tailored remedial legislation, an employee
will be protected from an employer improperly using its power to thwart
public policy, and the interests of the employee and society will be protected.
b. Narrowness of the Exception
A second argument that proponents may raise is that the public policy tort is a very narrow exception to the doctrine of employment at-will.
They would argue that the court’s decision in Cudney was correct because it properly narrowed the scope of the exception to only those cases
where other adequate means of protecting public policy are not available.
The public policy tort requires the court to balance the interests of employees, employers, and society.199 Proponents of the Cudney decision
may argue that the interest of society in freedom of contract will only be
outweighed by the interest to protect public policy when that policy is
threatened. Thus, where other adequate means to protect the public policy exist, there is no need for societal concern.
But public policy may still be threatened, even if other means are
available for protection. If an employee can make a complaint within
thirty days, and the court finds that to be an adequate remedy, society
199. See supra note 17.
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may still have an interest in the public policy of protecting whistleblowers. If an employer is allowed to terminate a whistleblower, escaping liability only because the employee did not file a complaint within thirty
days, then it is highly probable that this type of employee conduct will be
discouraged. If employees are not protected in reporting inappropriate
activity, then those reports are likely to stop. Regardless of what other
means may exist to protect public policy, deterring an employee from
reporting such activity is contrary to public policy, and thus societal interests will weigh in favor of protecting the employee’s interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since Washington’s 1984 adoption of the common law tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, courts have determined
that it is a narrow exception to the doctrine of employment at-will. In
Cudney, the court narrowed the exception too far. By foreclosing a
wrongful discharge claim in workplace safety cases, the court has constrained the potential remedies available to an employee to the narrow
remedies provided by the WISHA anti-discrimination statute. The requirement that an employee file a complaint within thirty days of termination, the absence of a robust administrative scheme, and the lack of full
remedies available renders these statutory remedies inadequate to protect
public policy. Furthermore, the court’s determination that a criminal
statute also forecloses a common law claim, despite a complete lack of
remedy for an employee, creates a strong disincentive for an employee to
report illegal conduct and undermines the foundation of the public policy
exception.
The narrow public policy exception to at-will employment is intended to prevent employers from discharging an employee in contravention of a clear public policy. The court’s decision in Cudney provided the
employer with impunity to do just that. In order to rectify this deviation
from past precedent and from the purpose of the tort, the Washington
legislature should enact narrow remedial legislation providing an employee with a private cause of action. Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court should consider reframing the limits of the public policy
exception in a future case. Without action from either the legislature or
the court, or both, many wrongfully discharged employees will find that
the door to the public policy exception has been firmly closed by the
court.

